

















By Steven J. Brams, Department of 
Politics, New York University, USA 
D. Marc Kilgour, Department of 
Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, 
Canada 
 The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano (I), web site: www.feem.it, e-mail: working.papers@feem.it 
 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Series 
Editor: Carlo Carraro 
Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation 
By Steven J. Brams, Department of Politics, New York University, USA 




Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners.  We propose a procedure 
whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, 
majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions.  If there is more than one fallback 
coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition 
will form.  The players(s) who are the first to be acceptable to all other members of a 
fallback coalition are the leader(s)  of that coalition. The effects of different preference 
assumptions—particularly, different kinds of single-peakedness—and of player weights on 
the number of coherent coalitions, their connectedness, and which players become 
kingmakers and leaders are investigated.  The fallback procedure may be used (i) 
empirically to identify kingmakers and leaders or (ii) normatively to select them.      
 
Keywords: Coalition, Fallback Process, Kingmaker Leader, Cardinally Single-peaked, 
Ordinally Single-peaked 
 
JEL Classification: C71, C78, D72 
 
 
This paper has been presented at the 14th Coalition Theory Network Workshop held in Maastricht, 
The Netherlands, on 23-24 January 2009 and organised by the Maastricht University CTN group 














Address for correspondence: 
 
Marc Kilgour 
Department of Mathematics 
Wilfrid Laurier University 
Waterloo Ontario  N2L 3C5 
Canada 









Steven J. Brams 
Department of Politics 
New York University 




D. Marc Kilgour 
Department of Mathematics 
Wilfrid Laurier University 









September 2008   2
 
Abstract 
Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners.  We propose a 
procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, 
or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions.  If there is more than 
one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which 
fallback coalition will form.  The players(s) who are the first to be acceptable to all other 
members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition.   
The effects of different preference assumptions—particularly, different kinds of 
single-peakedness—and of player weights on the number of coherent coalitions, their 
connectedness, and which players become kingmakers and leaders are investigated.  The 
fallback procedure may be used (i) empirically to identify kingmakers and leaders or (ii) 
normatively to select them.        3
Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation 
1.  Introduction 
 
Members of voting bodies may form coalitions for a variety of reasons.  In this 
paper, we assume they do so in order to belong to a coalition with a simple majority of 
members (a decision rule based on weights will be used later).    
In voting bodies with more than a few players, many different winning coalitions 
are often possible.  In this paper, we focus on those that, in a sense to be made precise 
later, are internally compatible, or coherent, and therefore likely to be stable.  If there is 
only one coherent coalition, we assume that it forms and will indeed be stable.   
If there is more than one coherent coalition, we identify kingmakers, who are the 
common members of all coherent coalitions who collectively decide which coalition will 
be “king.”
1  If they agree on a preferred coherent coalition, we assume it will form and be 
stable.  If they disagree on which coherent coalition to support, their disagreement 
presumably creates instability. 
Leaders are the first member(s) of coherent coalitions to be acceptable to all their 
members.  Although leaders may also be kingmakers, this need not be the case. 
To identify coherent coalitions—and ultimately kingmakers and leaders—we 
assume that players strictly rank each other, from best to worst, as coalition partners.  
These rankings determine coherent winning coalitions, based on a process whereby 
players “fall back” on their preferences until one or more winning coalitions forms. 
                                                 
1 We could as well use the terms “queen” and “queenmaker” instead of “king” and “kingmaker.”  With no 
intention of favoring one gender or the other, we use the latter terms for convenience.  Whether a 
kingmaker is a man or a woman, we mean a player who can choose among majority coalitions to 
implement. Whether this player pulls strings behind the scene, or aspires to be a leader (see our definition 
of this term in the next paragraph), we show later that these roles may or may not coincide.       4
We begin by assuming that the preference rankings of the players are “ordinally 
single-peaked,” but later we show how this assumption can be tightened to “cardinally 
single-peaked.”  Such a tightening rules out disconnected coalitions—those that leave out 
a member along, say, a left-right scale.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2 we define and illustrate the fallback 
model, which determines both how many and which coherent winning coalitions can 
form.   
In section 3, we show that if preferences are ordinally single-peaked, a coherent 
coalition may be disconnected if there are 5 or more players.  If there are 4 players, either 
a simple-majority or grand coalition may form, whereas only a simple-majority coalition 
may form if there are 3 players. 
In section 4 we show that if there are two or more coherent winning coalitions, 
there must be at least two kingmakers.  There may be more than two if there are at least 7 
players, and there may be more than two fallback coalitions if there are at least 9 players.  
In section 5 we analyze the role that leaders play.  Among our findings is that 
leaders, who will generally be middle players in a coherent coalition—neither the 
leftmost nor the rightmost players—may on occasion be extreme.  In the latter case, 
however, there will be middle player(s) who are also leaders. 
In section 6 we analyze the effects of cardinally single-peaked preferences, which 
ensure that only connected coalitions form and preclude extreme players from being 
leaders.  We also illustrate how the different weights of players (e.g., parties in a 
parliament) may affect coalition formation, showing, for example, that a unique 
disconnected FB coalition may form with as few as 4 players.  For different   5
configurations of 4 large and small players, we calculate the probability that FB 
coalitions are disconnected or contain superfluous members.  
Besides its use as an explanatory and predictive tool, we suggest in section 7 how 
the fallback model might be used for normative purposes.  Applied to players with 
different weights like political parties, it provides a method for selecting a governing 
coalition and identifying its kingmakers and leaders.  
2.  The Fallback Model: Coherent Winning Coalitions 
We assume that all players, designated 1, 2, . . ., n, strictly rank each other as 
coalition partners, as illustrated by Example A, where n = 5:  
Example A.     1:  2 3 4 5      2: 1 3 4 5      3: 4 5 2 1      4: 3 2 1 5      5: 4 3 2 1 
We suppose a simple majority of players is needed to form a winning coalition. 
Each player ranks itself first—that is, it most desires to be included in any majority 
coalition that forms.  Thus in Example A, player 1, after itself, most prefers player 2 as a 
coalition partner, followed by players 3, 4, and 5 in that order.  A complete listing of all 
players’ preferences, as illustrated in Example A, is called a preference profile.    
The single-peakedness assumption is that the players can be placed along a line—
in order 1, 2, 3, …, n from left to right—so that each player’s preference for coalition 
partners is single-peaked in that it declines monotonically to the left and right of its own 
position.  A preference profile that satisfies this condition is called ordinally single-
peaked (Brams, Jones, and Kilgour, 2002, 2005).  Such profiles are commonly assumed 
in spatial models of candidate and party competition and are empirically valid 
representations of preferences in many countries.   6
To express ordinal single-peakedness in another way, consider any subset of 
players along the line; call the left-most player l and the right-most player r.  The set is 
connected if it is of the form {l, l + 1, …, r}: It contains exactly the players from l to r, 
inclusive (Brams, Jones, and Kilgour, 2002).   
A preference profile is ordinally single-peaked if and only if, for each k = 1, 2, …, 
n, every player’s k most-preferred coalition partners, including itself, form a connected 
set.  Thus in Example A, when k = 3, the most-preferred 3-coalitions of players—123 for 
player 1, 213 for player 2, 345 for player 3, 432 for player 4, and 543 for player 5—are 
all connected sets.  For all other k between 1 and 5, it is easy to see that the most-
preferred k-coalitions of all players are connected, so the preference profile of Example A 
is ordinally single-peaked. 
An ordinally single-peaked preference profile may or may not be geometrically 
realizable in the sense that the n players can be positioned along the real line to satisfy the 
following condition: Between any two players, a player’s preferred coalition partner is 
the player closer to its own position.  If players can be so positioned, the preference 
profile is called cardinally single-peaked.   
To see that this condition is not satisfied in Example A, assume that player i is 
located at position pi on the line.  We denote the distance between positions pi and pj to 
be dij  = |pi – pj|.  From player 3’s preference ordering, and because player 4 must be 
located between players 3 and 5, d54 < d53 < d32.  But from player 4’s ordering, and 
because player 3 must be located between players 2 and 4, d32  < d42  < d54.  This 
contradiction shows that the ordinally single-peaked preference profile of Example A is 
not cardinally single-peaked.   7
Single-peakedness that is ordinal but not cardinal may be interpreted to mean that, 
while the players agree on the ordering of their positions, they have different perceptions 
of the distances between pairs of players.  In Example A, player 3 and player 4’s 
perceptions may be visualized as follows: 
Player 3’s perception:  1     2                          3     4     5 
Player 4’s perception:  1     2     3     4                          5 
For player 3, the distance between it and player 2 is greater than the distance between 
players 5 and 4, whereas for player 4 the opposite is true, though the two players have the 
same left-right ordering.  If player preferences are not ordinally (and therefore not 
cardinally) single-peaked, we say they are not single-peaked.   
The fallback (FB) process of majority coalition formation unfolds as follows 
(Brams, Jones, and Kilgour, 2002, 2005; Brams and Kilgour, 2001): 
1.  Each player considers only its most preferred coalition partner.  If two players 
mutually prefer each other, and this is a majority of players, then this is the majority 
coalition that forms.  The process stops, and we call this a level 1 majority coalition, 
because only first-choice partners are included. 
2.  If there is no level 1 majority coalition, each player then considers its two most 
preferred coalition partners.  A coalition then forms consisting of any maximal subset 
containing a majority of players that mutually prefer each other at these two levels. 
(There may be more than one such coalition.)  The process stops, and we call this a level 
2 majority coalition.    8
3.  The players successively descend to lower and lower levels in their rankings 
until a majority coalition (or coalitions), all of whose members mutually prefer each 
other, forms for the first time.  The process stops, with the set of largest majority 
coalition(s)—not contained in any others at this level—designated FB coalitions.
2     
What does FB yield in Example A?  At level 1, observe that player 1 prefers player 
2, and player 2 prefers 1, so we designate 12 as a level 1 coalition, as is also coalition 34.
3  
Descending one level, player 3 likes player 5, and player 5 likes player 3, yielding 35 as a 
coalition at level 2.  Descending one more level, majority coalitions 124 and 234 form for 
the first time: Each player in these coalitions finds the other two players acceptable at 
level 3 (or better).  In summary, we have the following coalitions at each level: 
Level 1:  12, 34                 Level 2:  35                 Level 3:  124, 234 
Note that coalitions are listed at the level at which they form, except that subcoalitions 
are never listed.  Thus, 14, 23, and 24 form at level 3 but do not appear in our listing, 
because they are proper subsets of coalitions 124 or 234.    
Since coalitions 124 and 234 are the first majority coalitions to form, the process 
stops, rendering FB = {124, 234}.  These are the coherent majority coalitions, because 
                                                 
2 In Brams, Jones, and Kilgour (2005), we called the set of such coalitions FB1 coalitions, where the 
subscript 1 indicated majority coalitions that form for the first time.  Because in this paper we do not 
consider as coherent those coalitions that form later (i.e., after further descent), we drop the subscript 1.  
For a stronger notion of coherence based on a “build-up” model of coalition formation, see Brams, Jones, 
and Kilgour (2002, 2005).  Build-up coalitions tend to be larger than fallback coalitions, primarily because 
the build-up process precludes coalitions from forming whose members rank outside members higher than 
inside members.  
3 We assume these preferences are truthful.  In future work, we plan to investigate conditions under which 
players can misrepresent their preferences to their advantage.  In the case of political parties, their track 
records would seem to make misrepresentation more difficult than for individuals.     9
they are the first to form in the descent process and maximize the minimum ranking of 
any player (Brams and Kilgour, 2001).
4  
If the descent process were to continue to level 4, every player would be 
acceptable to every other, yielding the grand coalition, 12345—as well as the eight 3-
player coalitions that did not form earlier and the five 4-player coalitions.  But since these 
3-player and 4-player coalitions are proper subsets of the grand coalition, they would not 
be listed as level 4 coalitions—only 12345 would be.  But because 12345 is not the first 
majority coalition to form under FB, it is not an FB coalition.  
3.  Disconnected, Simple-Majority, and Grand Coalitions 
In this and the next two sections, we assume that the preferences of players are 
ordinally single-peaked.  In section 6 we show some consequences of preferences being 
cardinally single-peaked.  
Preferences in Example A are ordinally single-peaked, but one of the two FB 
coalitions (124) is disconnected: There is a “hole” due to the absence of player 3.  Player 
3 is excluded from coalition 124 because, whereas players 1 and 2 necessarily rank player 
3 higher than player 4 (because of ordinal single-peakedness), player 3 ranks players 2 
and 1 at the bottom of its preference order.  In particular, player 3 does not consider 
player 1 acceptable at level 3, which excludes player 3 from FB coalition 124.   
It is easy to extend Example A to show that one or more FB coalitions may be 
disconnected if there are more than 5 players.  However, a minimum of 7 players is 
                                                 
4 That is, they are the coalitions in which players rank a least-preferred member highest.  In addition, a 
coherent coalition is Pareto-optimal—no other majority coalitions can be considered at least as good by all 
of its members and better by at least one of them (Brams and Kilgour, 2001).     10
required for there to be a unique FB coalition that is disconnected (Brams, Jones, and 
Kilgour, 2005).  
Unlike Example A, there may be no simple-majority FB coalition—the only FB 
coalition may be the grand coalition, as illustrated by the following 4-player example: 
Example B.              1: 2 3 4                2: 1 3 4                3: 4 2 1                4: 3 2 1 
Checking the coalitions that form at each level,   
Level 1:  12, 34                 Level 2:  23                 Level 3:  1234 
we see that there is no 3-player simple-majority coalition at level 2.  Instead, there is a 
direct jump to the grand coalition, 1234, at level 3, making it the unique FB coalition.  On 
the other hand, if player 3’s preference were 3: 2 1 4 in Example B, the simple-majority 
coalition 123 would form at level 2.   
A disconnected coalition, like 124, cannot form in a 4-player example.  This is 
because player 4 cannot accept player 1 until the fallback process descends to level 3, 
which would produce the grand coalition, 1234, instead.   
The foregoing examples, reasoning, and references give us 
Proposition 1.  FB coalitions maximize the minimum ranking of a player and are 
Pareto-optimal.  If player preferences are ordinally single-peaked, an FB coalition may 
be disconnected if and only if n ≥ 5, and a disconnected coalition may be the unique FB 
coalition if and only if n ≥ 7.   
Curiously, when preferences are ordinally single-peaked, the grand coalition 
cannot be an FB coalition if there are n = 3 players.  To see this, note first that the   11
preferences of players 1 and 3 are fixed by the ordinal single-peakedness assumption.
5 
Thus, there are only two possible examples:   
Example C.              1: 2 3                  2: 1 3                   3: 2 1       
and the “mirror image” example, C’, in which player 2’s preference is 2: 3 1.  In Example 
C, the FB coalition 12 forms at level 1, whereas coalition 23 forms at level 1 in Example 
C’.  Thus, if n = 3 and preferences are ordinally single-peaked, the FB coalition is either 
12 or 23—depending on the preference of player 2—which makes player 2 a 
“kingmaker” in a sense to be defined in section 4.  More generally, we have 
Proposition 2.  Assume player preferences are ordinally single-peaked.  If n = 3, 
FB coalitions must be of size 2.  If n = 4, FB coalitions must be of size 3 or 4.  If n ≥ 5, 













n  members.  In 
particular, the grand coalition can be an FB coalition if and only if n = 4.
6   
Proof.  The cases n = 3 and n = 4 are discussed above.  Also, an FB coalition must 






, for otherwise it would not be a majority coalition.  To complete 
                                                 
5 For any n, at least one 2-player coalition must form at level 1 if preferences are ordinally single-peaked 
(Brams, Jones, and Kilgour, 2005).  Those that form in Examples C and C’, the  two ordinally single-
peaked preference profiles with 3 players, are FB coalitions.  In fact, these preference profiles also satisfy 
the stronger property of cardinal single-peakedness, because the players’ preferences are consistent with 
distances when they are appropriately located along the real line (see section 6 for another example).   
6 Note that  m ⎣ ⎦ indicates the largest integer equal to or less than m, and  m ⎡ ⎤ indicates the smallest integer 
equal to or greater than m.   12

















n  players. 
Now suppose that n ≥ 5, and that d is an integer satisfying 1 ≤ d ≤ 
2
1 − n
.   Define 
the following subsets of players: SL = {1, 2, …, d}, S = {d + 1, d + 2, …, n – d}, and  SU 
= { n – d + 1, n – d + 2, …, n}.  (SL contains the d left-most players, and SU the d right-
most. The nonextreme players are in S, which is nonempty because d ≤ (n – 1)/2, which 
implies that d + 1 ≤ n – d.)  Any player i’s d least-preferred coalition partners must be 
within SL U SU.  In particular, if i ∈ S, then i’s n – d – 1 most-preferred coalition partners 
can exclude only members of SL U SU, and therefore must include all members of S other 
than i.   







d  and note that (since n ≥ 5) 
d < n /4, so that n – 2d > n/2, which implies that S is a majority coalition.  It follows that, 
if no FB coalition forms at level less than n – d – 1, then an FB coalition including all 
players in S must form at level n – d – 1.  Moreover, the largest coalition that can form at 







n d n  players.  Q.E.D.   13
As a corollary to the theorem, note that, if n ≥ 5, an FB coalition must form at or 















n .  Thus, if n = 5, an FB coalition 
must form at either level 2 or 3—but never at level 4, which yields the grand coalition. 
4.  Kingmakers 
So far we have shown that if preferences are ordinally single-peaked, a single FB 
coalition of 2 players forms at level 1 when n = 3  (Examples C and C’).  When n = 4, a 
single FB coalition of 3 players forms at level 2, or a single FB coalition of 4 players (i.e., 
the grand coalition, 1234) forms at level 3.  Only when n ≥ 5 is it possible for there to be 
more than one FB coalition, whose common members are kingmakers: They determine 
which, if any, FB coalition forms.           
In Example A, players 2 and 4 are common to FB coalitions 124 and 234, but they 
disagree on which of the two FB coalitions they prefer.  Player 2 prefers coalition 124, 
because it ranks noncommon player 1 above noncommon player 3, whereas player 4 
prefers coalition 234 because of the opposite ranking.  This split of the kingmakers on 
which FB coalition they prefer suggests that either is possible, leaving the outcome 
indeterminate.  Such indeterminacy may lead to a factional battle between players 2 and 4 
over which FB coalition will prevail.   
This is not always the case, as the following 5-player example illustrates:   
Example D.     1:  2 3 4 5      2: 3 4 1 5      3: 4 2 1 5      4: 3 5 2 1      5: 4 3 2 1 
The coalitions that form at each level are as follows: 
Level 1: 34                 Level 2: 23, 45                 Level 3: 123, 234   14
Players 2 and 3, which are common to (connected) FB coalitions 123 and 234, are the 
kingmakers.  Because each prefers noncommon player 4 (in 234) to noncommon player 1 
(in 123), the kingmakers will both support 234 over 123.  Hence, FB coalition 234 will 
form and be stable because of the agreement of the kingmakers. 
There are two kingmakers in both 5-player examples, A and D.  In each example, 
preferences are ordinally but not cardinally single-peaked.
7  In principle, it is possible for 
for exactly one player to be common to two majority coalitions (e.g., player 3 is the 
unique common member of 123 and 345), but this can never happen under FB with 
ordinally single-peaked preferences, as shown by the following proposition: 
Proposition 3.  Assume player preferences are ordinally single-peaked.  Any pair 
of distinct FB coalitions must have at least two common members (kingmakers), whose 
preferred FB coalition may or may not be the same. 
Proof.  Two distinct majority coalitions must have at least one member, say i, in 
common.  Suppose that there are no other common members.  Then in order for i to find 
the n – 1 other members of the two coalitions acceptable, the FB descent must go to level 
n – 1, which is the level that produces the grand coalition and makes it the unique FB 
coalition.  This contradiction shows that there must be at least two common members. 
Examples A and D show that common members (kingmakers) may agree or disagree on 
which FB coalition is preferable.  Q.E.D. 
                                                 
7 In section 2, we showed this for Example A.  For Example D, assume that players 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 can be 
positioned along a line such that their preferences decrease with distance.  Using the notation of section 2, 
we first show that d45 < d12.  From player 4’s preferences, d45 < d24, and from player 2’s preferences, d24 < 
d12, so together we have d45 < d12.  But we can also show that d12 < d45.  From player 3’s preferences, d34 < 
d23 and d13 < d35.  Rewriting the first inequality as -d23 < -d34 and summing yields d12 = d13 – d23  < d35 – d34 
= d45.  This contradiction shows that preferences are ordinally but not cardinally single-peaked in Example 
D.   15
We next show that as the number of players increases, there may be more than two 
common members (kingmakers). 
Proposition 4.  Assume player preferences are ordinally single-peaked.  If n < 5, 
there is one FB coalition and, therefore, no kingmakers.   If n = 5, there can be at most 
two kingmakers.  If n > 5, there may be more than 2 kingmakers.  
Proof.  We showed previously that if n = 3, there is one simple-majority FB 
coalition, and if n = 4 there is also one FB coalition, which may be either simple majority 
or grand.  When n = 5, there may be two FB coalitions (Examples A and D) and therefore 
at least two kingmakers (Proposition 3).  For there to be 3 kingmakers when n = 5, the FB 
coalitions would have to be 1234 and 2345, with common members 2, 3, and 4.  But this 
would require that player 3 find both players 1 and 2 on its left and players 4 and 5 on its 
right acceptable.  This can only happen when FB descends to level 4, which results in the 
grand coalition, 12345, in which case there is only one FB coalition and no kingmakers.          
Now consider the following 6-player example:  
Example E.        1: 2 3 4 5 | 6         2: 3 4 1 5 | 6        3: 2 1 4 5 | 6         
                           4: 3 2 5 1 | 6         5: 6 4 3 2 | 1        6: 5 4 3 2 | 1  
It is easy to verify that at level 4 in the FB descent (one level from the bottom)—shown 
by the vertical bars in each player’s ranking—FB coalitions 1234 and 2345 form and 
have 3 common members (kingmakers), 2, 3, and 4.  This 6-player example can readily 
be extended to more than 6 players.  Q.E.D.  
Not only may there be more kingmakers as the number of players increases, but 
there also may be more FB coalitions.   16
Proposition 5.  Assume player preferences are ordinally single-peaked.  If n ≤ 8, 
there cannot be more than 2 FB coalitions, but if n ≥ 9, there may be more than 2 FB 
coalitions.  
Proof.  To verify the extreme case, suppose that n = 8 and that S1, S2, and S3 are 
distinct FB coalitions of size 5.  First suppose that S1, S2, and S3 have a common member, 
say i.  Then at the level of formation of the FB coalitions, i must approve all members of 
S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3.  There are two possibilities: connected coalitions, such as 12345, 23456, 
and 34567, or at least one coalition with a hole, such as 12345, 45678, and 12678.   
In the first case, there must be a common player, such as 4, who finds acceptable 
every player except 8, so the coalitions must form at level 6.  But at level 6, every player 
finds acceptable every other player except either 1 or 8, so (at least) the coalition 234567 
must form, contradicting the assumption that 23456 and 34567 form as distinct coalitions.   
In the second case, left-out players in the hole, such as 4, find acceptable players 
outside the hole, such as 2 and 6, at the required level, because they are members of both 
connected coalitions, 12345 and 45678.  Moreover, player 2 must prefer 4 to 6, and 
player 6 must prefer 4 to 2.  Thus, any coalition that contains 2 and 6 must contain 4.  
The argument applies for any coalition with a hole.  
Now consider the following 9-player example:  
Example F.          1: 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 9          2: 1 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 9          3: 2 1 4 5 6 7 | 8 9         
                             4: 3 2 5 6 1 7 | 8 9          5: 4 3 6 7 2 1 | 8 9          6: 7 5 4 3 8 2 | 1 9  
                             7: 8 9 6 5 4 3 | 2 1          8: 9 7 6 5 4 3 | 2 1          9: 8 7 6 5 4 3 | 2 1 
When the level of descent reaches 6 (two levels from the bottom), FB coalitions 12345, 
23456, and 34567 form.  Thus, there are 3 FB coalitions.    Q.E.D.        17
In Example F, note that players 3, 4, and 5 are “full kingmakers,” as they belong to all 
three FB coalitions. Also, players 2 and 6 each belong to two of the three FB coalitions, 
so they are “partial kingmakers.”  Subsequently, we will focus on full kingmakers (or just 
kingmakers), who are common members of every FB coalition.   
The maximum number of FB coalitions increases with the number of players.  For 
example, when n = 13, four FB coalitions can form at level 9, as Example G 
demonstrates. 
Example G.          1: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 11 12 13          2: 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 11 12 13 
                              3: 2 1 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 11 12 13          4: 3 2 1 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 11 12 13                           
                   5: 4 3 2 1 6 7 8 9 10 | 11 12 13          6: 5 4 3 2 1 7 8 9 10 | 11 12 13 
                   7: 8 9 10 6 5 4 3 2 1 | 11 12 13          8: 9 10 11 7 6 5 4 3 2 | 1 12 13 
                   9: 10 11 12 8 7 6 5 4 3 | 2 1 13          10: 11 12 13 9 8 7 6 5 4 | 3 2 1 
                   11: 12 13 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 | 3 2 1          12: 13 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 | 3 2 1 
                   13: 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 | 3 2 1 
It is not difficult to ascertain that the FB coalitions in this example are 1234567, 
2345678, 3456789, and 456789/10 (the slash indicates that 10 is a single player). 
  We next show that, for any integer k = 3, 4, 5, …, there exists an ordinally single-
peaked preference profile that leads to the formation of k FB coalitions.  These profiles 
require n < 4k – 3 players, which we conjecture are the minimal profiles that yield k FB 
coalitions.
8  
                                                 
8 More precisely, we conjecture that if n ≥ 5, then a maximum of  ⎣ ⎦ 4 / ) 3 ( + = n k  FB coalitions can 
form.  The previous analysis established that the conjecture is true when n = 5 (k = 2) and n = 9 (k = 3), 
which are the values for which (n + 3)/4 is an integer.  Example G demonstrates that k = 4 coalitions can 
form when n = 13, but we did not prove that at most 3 FB coalitions can form when n < 13.    18
Proposition 6.  Let k ≥ 2 be an integer.  Then there is an ordinally single-peaked 
preference profile in which there are n = 4k – 3 players, and k FB coalitions of size s = 
2k – 1 form at level l* = 3k – 3.  
Proof.  We define the preference of the n = 4k – 3 players.  Let xi(l) be player i’s  
l
th most-preferred coalition partner) for l = 1, 2, ..., 4k − 4 = n − 1.  First, set   
x1(l) = l + 1 and x4k − 3(l) = 4k − 3 − l for l = 1, 2, ..., 4k − 4. 
For i = 2, 3, ..., 2k − 2, define 
xi(l) = i − l for l = 1, 2, ..., i − 1, and  
xi(l) = l + 1 for l = i, i + 1, ..., 4k − 4. 
For i = 2k − 1, 2k, 2k + 1, ..., 3k − 3, let 
xi(l) = i + l for l = 1, 2, ..., k − 1,  
xi(l) = i + k − l − 1 for l = k, k + 1, ..., i + k − 2, and  
xi(l) = l + 1 for l = i + k − 1, i +  k, ..., 4k − 4. 
Finally, for i = 3k − 2, 3k − 1, ..., 4k − 4 = n − 1, set 
xi(l) = i + l for l = 1, 2, ..., n − i − 1 and  
xi(l) = i − l for l = n − i, n − i + 1, ..., 4k − 4. 
Next we determine the FB coalitions that form, given this preference profile.  Note 
that for any i ≤ 2k − 2, player i’s l* = 3k − 3 most-preferred coalition partners include 1, 
2, ..., i − 1 and i + 1, i + 2, ..., 3k − 2.  Now fix j = 1, 2, ..., or k.  Since j ≤ 2k − 2, players 
j, j + 1, ..., 2k − 2 find all players in {1, 2, ..., 3k − 2} acceptable at level l*.   19
Now consider any player i where 2k − 1 ≤ i ≤ j + 2k − 2.  (Note: In the case j = k 
and i = 3k − 2, a special argument is required.  We give it in the next paragraph.)  Player 
i’s l* = 3k − 3 most-preferred coalition partners include i, i + 1, ..., i + k − 1, i − 1, i − 2, 
..., i − 2k + 2.  Therefore, each player i in the indicated range finds all players j, j + 1, ..., 
2k − 2, 2k − 1, ..., j + 2k − 2, j + 2k − 1, ..., 3k − 2 at level l*.  This shows that the 
coalition {j, j + 1, ..., j + 2k − 2} forms at level l*. 
For the case j = k, the last player in the coalition {j, j + 1, ..., j + 2k − 2} is i = 3k − 
2.  Consideration of xi(d) in this case shows that player  i = 3k − 2 finds all players in {k, 
k + 1, ..., 4k − 3} acceptable at level l*.  Q.E.D.   
Proposition 6 gives the levels at which 2, 3, 4, . . .  FB coalitions can form, which 
are 3, 6, 9, . . . for n = 5, 9, 13, . . ..  Thus, when n increases by 4, the FB coalitions, now 
larger by one member, forms three levels later.  This increase is consistent with the 
conclusions of Proposition 2, in which the rate of increase of the maximum level of 
formation increases is about ¾ of the rate of increase of the number of players. 
We next return to the situation in which there are multiple FB coalitions.  If all 
kingmakers, who belong to two or more FB coalitions, agree on a preferred coalition, we 
call it stable, because it will be rational for them to implement it.  By the same token, if 
there is only one FB majority coalition, it will also be stable—at least compared with 
coalitions that form later, including the grand coalition.  
It is useful to refine the concept of stability to take account of size when there is 
only one FB coalition.  Following Riker’s (1962) size principle, we hypothesize that the 
larger a unique FB coalition, the less stable it will be.     20
In a 3-player system, there is only one FB coalition, which depends on the 
preference of the middle player (see Examples C and C’).  In section 3 we suggested that 
pivotal role that the middle player assumes is akin to that of kingmaker, even though 
there cannot be multiple FB coalitions in these examples.     
When there are 3 kingmakers, as in Examples E and F, the greater their 
disagreement on a single FB coalition, the less stable the one that actually forms is likely 
to be.  To illustrate these different levels of stability, consider Example E, in which 
kingmakers 2 and 3 prefer FB coalition 1234 over 2345, whereas kingmaker 4 prefers 
2345 over 1234, rendering 1234 majority-preferred.  Likewise, in Example G, 3 of the 4 
kingmakers prefer coalition 1234567.   
By contrast, in Example F, kingmaker 3 prefers coalition 12345, kingmaker 4 
prefers coalition 23456, and kingmaker 5 prefers coalition 34567, so there is no majority-
preferred coalition.  The preferences of players 2 and 6, who may also have input as 
partial kingmakers, make agreement even less likely, because player 2 prefers coalition 
12345 and player 6 prefers coalition 34567.  Hence, whichever of these FB coalitions 
forms, kingmakers will be unhappy, suggesting that any winning coalition will be 
unstable.   
5.  Leaders 
A leader of an FB coalition is a player who is acceptable to all other members of a 
coalition before, or at the same time as, all other members of the coalition.  In Example A 
(5 players), the leader of coalition 124 is player 2 at level 2 (players 3 and 4 become 
acceptable only at level 3), and the leader of coalition 234 is player 3 (players 1 and 4 
become acceptable only at level 3).  While player 2 is also a kingmaker, player 3 is not.     21
Note that the leaders in each of these FB coalitions are middle players—they are 
neither the leftmost nor the rightmost players in each coalition.  (We call the leftmost and 
rightmost player extreme players.)  Likewise in Example B (4 players), wherein 1234 is 
the unique FB coalition, the leaders are the two middle players, 2 and 3, which become 
acceptable at level 2.  In Example D (5 players), the unique leader in FB coalition 234 is 
middle player 3 at level 1.   
 Despite this preponderance of middle players as leaders, extreme players may also 
be leaders. 
Proposition 7.  Assume player preferences are ordinally single-peaked.  Then an 
extreme player may be a leader, but if so, there is another leader that is a middle player.  
Proof.  If n = 3, an extreme player cannot be a leader (see Example C).  So assume 
that n ≥ 4, and let i and j (with  i < j) be extreme players of an FB coalition.  Suppose that 
j is a leader of the FB coalition.  For definiteness, place j at the extreme right of the 
coalition, and let k be the member of the coalition immediately to the left of j, so that i < 
k < j, as illustrated below:  
i______________________k__j 
Now every member of the coalition except j (i.e., i through k) must approve of k at 
least one level prior to approving of j.  Because j must approve of k at the same level as 
the leftmost coalition member, i, approves of j, there must be players to j’s right whom j 
prefers to k.  In this case, k is also a leader.  Q.E.D. 
Example D provides an illustration of Proposition 7.  Players 2 (middle) and 3 (extreme) 
share leadership in FB coalition 123 at level 2.    22
While an extreme player may be a leader, most of our examples suggest that 
middle players are more likely to be leaders.  Our earlier 3-player case (Example C) is 
instructive in understanding the leadership advantage that middle players enjoy.  In this 
example, the unique FB coalition is 12, with both players 1 and 2 leaders at level 1.  If 
player 2’s preference were 2: 3 1 (Example C’), 23 would be the FB coalition, and player 
2 would still be a leader, this time with player 3.   
Assume player 2 is equally likely to favor player 1 (Example C) or player 3 
(Example C’).  With the latter players’ preferences fixed by ordinal single-peakedness, 
player 2 is twice as likely to be a leader as player 1 or player 3.  
What relationship, if any, is there between leaders and kingmakers?  It seems to be 
quite murky when preferences are ordinally single-peaked—leaders may or may not be 
kingmakers.  In section 6 we investigate consequences of the more stringent assumption 
of cardinal single-peakedness and also analyze the effects of different weights on the 
formation of unique disconnected FB coalitions.  
6.  Other Preferences, Different Weights 
Our previous propositions apply when the players have the same weights and their 
preferences are ordinally single-peaked.  We begin by tightening the latter assumption, 
showing that multiple coalitions may still form, but they are always connected and their 
leaders are always middle players.  Then we allow players to have different weights, 
showing that a unique disconnected FB coalition may form with as few as 4 players. 
Preferences are cardinally single-peaked when players can be positioned along a 
line such that a player’s preference decreases as distance from its position increases.  To 
illustrate, assume 5 players are positioned along a line as follows,   23
1_2_______________3_____4_5 
and all players perceive these distances in the same way (e.g., that the gap between 
players 2 and 3 is bigger than that between players 3 and 4).  Then it is easy to verify that 
these positions are consistent with the following rankings of coalitions partners by each 
player: 
Example H.     1:  2 3 4 5      2: 1 3 4 5      3: 4 5 2 1      4: 5 3 2 1      5: 4 3 2 1 
At level 1, coalitions 12 and 45 form, and at level 2 FB coalition 345 emerges and is the 
unique FB coalition. 
It is known (Brams, Jones, Kilgour, 2002) that when preferences are cardinally 
single-peaked, coalitions must be connected.  It may seem plausible that such preferences 
might also preclude multiple FB coalitions, but this is not the case. 
Proposition 8.  Assume preferences are cardinally single-peaked.  If n < 5, there is 
one FB coalition.  If n ≥ 5 there may be more than one FB coalition. 
Proof.  The first part of the proposition was established by Proposition 5, because 
cardinally single-peaked preferences are always ordinally single-peaked.  Now consider 
the following 5-player example, in which we give not only a left-right ordering of players 
along a line but also indicate, in parentheses, their exact positions: 
Example I.    1_______2_________3_______4_________________________5 
                      (0)           (2)                (5)           (7)                                              (13) 
The distances between these positions imply the following preferences: 
1:  2 3 4 5           2: 1 3 4 5           3: 4 2 1 5           4: 3 2 5 1           5: 4 3 2 1   24
It is easy to check that two FB coalitions, 123 and 234, form at level 3.  This example can 
readily be extended to show that more than one FB coalition can also form when n > 5.  
Q.E.D.      
Proposition 9.  Assume preferences are cardinally single-peaked.  Then any 
leader of an FB coalition is a middle player of that coalition.
9 
Proof.  The extreme players of an FB coalition approve of each other at a lower 
level of descent than do the middle players, because the distance from middle to extreme 
players is less than the distance from one extreme player to the other.  Therefore, the 
middle players of the FB coalition will be approved of earlier in the descent process, 
ensuring that one or more of them will be leader(s) of the FB coalition to the exclusion of 
the extreme players.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 9 contrasts with our earlier result for ordinally single-peaked 
preferences (Proposition 7), in which extreme players in an FB coalition may be 
(nonexclusive) leaders.  To summarize our findings on the effects of cardinal single-
peakedness, there (i) may be more than one FB coalition if n ≥ 5 and (ii) leaders of FB 
coalitions are always middle players.   
We next show that when player preferences are ordinally single-peaked but the 
players have different weights—as would be the case in a parliament if the players are 
parties and hold different numbers of seats—a unique disconnected coalition may form 
with only 4 players. (Recall that 7 players are required if the players have equal weights.)  
                                                 
9 If there are only 3 players, the two possible FB coalitions, 12 and 23, do not have a middle player (see 
Examples C and C’).  But as we suggested earlier, player 2 may be considered a kingmaker for being able 
to determine whether a left-center or right-center coalition forms.  Because player 2 is the first to be 
approved by both other players (players 1 and 3), player 2 would seem to qualify as a leader, too.         25
We assume in our subsequent analysis that the players may be either large (2 
votes) or small (1 vote).  We indicate the players by the first letters of the alphabet, with a 
player in upper case (e.g., A) indicating a large player and a player in lower case (e.g., a) 
indicating a small player. 
Proposition 10.  Assume players are not equally weighted, none is of majority 
size, and their preferences are ordinally single-peaked.  A unique disconnected FB 
coalition may form if and only if there are at least 4 players.    
Proof.  If n = 3, the middle player will be in an FB coalition with either the player 
on its left or the player on its right at level 1.  This coalition is connected and unique.   
Now assume that there are 4 players, one with weight 2 (A) and the other 3 with 
weight 1 each (a, b, c).  In Example J, their preferences are ordinally single-peaked with 
respect to ordering A a b c.  
Example J.              A:  a b c               a:  b c A               b:  a A c              c:  b a A   
At level 1, ab forms, but at level 2, ac and Ab form.  The latter is not only an FB coalition 
with a majority of 3 votes but also disconnected.  This example can readily be extended 
to show that a unique disconnected coalition may form with 5 or more players.  Q.E.D. 
Example J illustrates the case of (1 large, 3 small) players.  What if there are (2 
large, 2 small) players, or (3 large, 1 small) players?  We next illustrate these other 
configurations with examples, showing in the first example that a disconnected FB 
coalition forms (as in Example J).  In the second example, however, a connected FB 
coalition forms, but it is likely to become disconnected for strategic reasons.     26
Example K represents the configuration (2 large, 2 small) players that is ordinally 
single-peaked with respect to ordering A a B b. 
Example K.             A:  a B b              a:  B b A              B:  a A b              b:  B a A  
At level 1, aB forms, but at level 2, ab and AB form.  The latter is not only an FB 
coalition with a majority of 4 votes but also disconnected.   
Now consider Example L with respect to ordering A a B C.   
Example L.            A:  a B C             a:  a B C                B:  a A C               C:  B a A  
At level 1, Aa forms, but at level 2, connected FB coalition AaB forms.  However, player 
a is superfluous, because this coalition would be winning without player a.
10  Thus, 
players A and B might have good reason to eject player a, even though player a is the 
bridge, ideologically speaking, between players A and B.  The latter players not only have 
a majority of 4 votes but also constitute a disconnected coalition.  
Note that because the FB coalitions in Examples J, K, and L are unique, there are 
no kingmakers in these examples.  In Examples J and K, there is no single leader, 
because the two members of each FB coalition find each other acceptable at the same 
time (i.e., at level 2).  
In Example K, by contrast, player a is the unique leader in FB coalition AaB (at 
level 1), even though it seems the most likely player to be cast out for strategic reasons.   
Patently, the preferences of the players, on which FB coalitions are based, may clash with 
                                                 
10 In the parlance of game theory, player a is a dummy—its addition to any losing coalition can never make 
that coalition winning—which is not true, for example, of player b in FB coalition Ab in Example J.    27
the strategic realities of coalition formation, and even a leader may be found superfluous 
and ejected.
11          
Proposition 10 demonstrates the possibility of unique disconnected coalitions with 
as few as 4 players, but it does not address the probability of their occurrence, to which 
we now turn.  For the configuration (1 large, 3 small) players, there are four ways the 
large player, A, can be positioned from left to right, but they fall into pairs: A is either at 
one end, which we show as on the left in the top half of Table 1 (A a b c); or A is in the 
middle, which we show as second-from-the-left in the bottom half of Table 1 (a A b c).  
We do not show the mirror-image arrangements where A is on the right or second-from-
the right.  As well, we show only one of the 3! = 6 ways that the three small players can 
be assigned to their positions.  
Table 1 about here 
In the top half of the table, middle players a and b may rank the other players as 
shown in the first two columns (note that the extreme players, A and c, have only one 
ranking of the other players because of ordinal single-peakedness, so their rankings are 
not shown).  Likewise in the bottom half, we give the possible rankings of the middle 
players, A and b, in the first two columns.  For each half, we show in the second two 
columns the unique FB coalition that forms, the level at which it does so, and its leaders.  
                                                 
11 This would also seem true in the unweighted case: If an FB coalition is not minimal winning, won’t some 
player(s) be ejected to make it minimal winning?  Consider Example B, in which the unique FB coalition is 
the grand coalition, 1234.  Two of the four players rank player 1 last, and two rank player 4 last, so it is not 
clear which player will be ejected.  In Example L, by comparison, only player a can be ejected and still 
leave FB coalition AaB, now reduced to AB, winning.  Moreover, all players know from the beginning of 
the process that player a, if a member of he winning coalition, will be superfluous.  For this reason, Riker’s 
(1962) size principle, which predicts the formation of minimal winning coalitions under certain conditions, 
would seem more applicable to Example L than to Example B.    28
Observe that only in the last row of the top half of Table 1 does a disconnected 
coalition (Ab), which is indicated by an asterisk (*), form.  If the 18 cases in Table 1 are 
equiprobable, then the probability of a disconnected coalition is 1/18 ≈ 0.056, or about 6 
percent.   
Table 2 shows all the ways of positioning (2 large, 2 small) players, in which we 
assume A is always to the left of B, and a is always to the left of b.  As in Table 1, we 
show the rankings of the middle players in the first two columns, and the FB coalitions, 
the levels at which they form, and their leaders in the last two columns.   
Table 2 about here 
Unlike Table 1, the 18 lines in the first half and the 18 in the second half (i.e., the 
continuation) of Table 2 cannot be counted equally.  In the second half, the mirror image 
of ordering can be obtained by reversing players of equal weight—A and B, a and b, or 
both, giving (2)(2)(2) = 8 cases.  For example, the mirror image of A a b B is B b a A, 
which can be obtained by exchanging players of equal weight.  Thus, each line of the 
second half of Table 2 represents 4 rather than 8 distinct cases.  
By contrast, the mirror image of A a B b (in the first half of the table) is b B a A, 
which cannot be obtained by reversing equally weighted players.  Hence, in the first half 
of the table, each line represents 8 distinct cases.  If all the distinct cases are 
equiprobable, the probability of a disconnected coalition is 1/27 ≈ 0.037, or about 4 
percent.    
Finally, in Table 3, we show all the ways of positioning (3 large, 1 small) players, 
using the same notation as we did in Tables 1 and 2.  In this configuration, however, that 
there are no disconnected FB coalitions.   29
Table 3 about here 
Notice that there are FB coalitions with superfluous members, which are indicated 
by the number sign (#), in all three configurations.  Assuming all distinct cases in each 
are equiprobable, their probabilities are 1/18 ≈ 0.056 for (1 large, 3 small) players (Table 
1), 23/54 ≈ 0.426 for (2 large, 2 small) players (Table 2), and 2/9 ≈ 0.222 for (3 large, 1 
small) players (Table 3).  Clearly, superfluous players are relatively common in the latter 
two configurations.    
Perhaps surprisingly, a superfluous player may be not only a small player, as we 
illustrated in Example L, but also a large player—and even both a large and a small 
player when the grand coalition forms at level 4 (this happens in several cases in Tables 2 
and 3).  Also note that leaders may be either small or large players (sometimes both); 
moreover, they are always middle players in FB coalitions that have 3 or 4 members.      
We conclude that while the theoretical probability of disconnected coalitions is 
small (6 percent in Table 1, 4 percent in Table 2, and 0 percent in Table 3), the 
probability of superfluous members may be much larger (6 percent in Table 1, 43 percent 
in Table 2, and 22 percent in Table 3).  In the latter two configurations, oversized 
winning coalitions are quite likely, at least initially, to form.   
But it is also likely that superfluous members will either be ejected or leave when 
the coalition is forced to trim its sails for cost reasons or to minimize ideological distance.  
As a case in point, consider FB coalition AaBC in Table 3 (it appears twice in the lower 
half of this table and is, of course, the grand coalition).  It seems probable that the first 
member to leave will be an extreme member (e.g., A), but A’s departure is likely to 
trigger the departure of a since this player is also superfluous.    30
It would be useful to analyze data on coalitions that actually formed in 
parliamentary systems—or perhaps weighted voting bodies like the EU Council of 
ministers—in which there is information on the ordering of players on, say, a left-right 
scale.  Does the FB model predict which players coalesced?  How often do disconnected 
coalitions, or coalitions with superfluous players, form, and is this frequency in accord 
with theoretical calculations grounded in the equiprobability assumption?  If not, how 
might this assumption be modified? 
7.  Conclusions 
We assume in the FB model that players strictly rank, from best to worst, other 
players as coalition partners.  FB then finds coherent majority coalitions, in which all 
members find each other acceptable for the first time in the descent process.   
If preferences are ordinally single-peaked, FB coalitions, from simple majority to 
grand—but grand only if n = 2 or 4—may form.  In general, the number of possible FB 
coalitions increases with n, for which we gave a formula.  We also gave a formula for the 
maximum level at which an FB coalition must form.  
If n ≥ 5 and two or more FB coalitions form, they will have at least two common 
members; moreover, at least one of these coalitions may be disconnected.  We called the 
common members kingmakers, because they determine which FB coalition will actually 
be chosen.   
An FB coalition is stable if it is unique or—if there is more than one FB 
coalition—the kingmakers agree on which coalition they prefer.  If the kingmakers 
disagree, there is likely to be a leadership struggle, rendering unstable any FB coalition 
that forms.     31
The leader(s) of an FB coalition are the first player(s) to be acceptable to all its 
members.  If preferences are ordinally single-peaked, leaders are usually middle players 
in a coalition—neither the leftmost nor the rightmost members—but they can be extreme 
members as well.  If preferences are spatially single-peaked, however, leaders are always 
middle players.  
If players are not equally weighted, unique disconnected FB coalitions may form 
when there are as few as 4 players.  We showed this to be true in three configurations—(1 
large, 3 small), (2 large, 2 small), and (3 large, 1 small)—and illustrated the calculation of 
all possible positions and preferences of such players for the purpose of determining the 
probability of there being a disconnected FB coalition, or one with superfluous members 
(dummies).   
In theory, disconnected coalitions are infrequent in the first two configurations and 
impossible in the third, but superfluous members are quite common in the second and 
third configurations.  In the latter two configurations, oversized coalitions may form 
initially, but they are likely to get pared down.  Their leaders may be either large or small 
players (or both) and sometimes superfluous.     
Insofar as players explicitly or implicitly rank coalition partners, one can test, 
empirically, propositions in this paper.  While it is not obvious how one can 
operationalize kingmakers, who often play hidden roles, it should be possible to identify 
FB coalitions and leaders.  In a parliament, for example, one can determine which 
coalitions of parties form a government—or compete to form one—and identify who 
their leaders are (usually the heads of the largest parties, who tend to be centrists).  One 
can also ascertain when coalitions are disconnected, as has happened on occasion in   32
countries like Germany and Israel when the large left and right parties combined, leaving 
out small parties in the middle because they were dummies.
12  
FB could be used for the normative purpose of selecting a governing coalition and 
its leaders.  This would seem a serious alternative to the haggling and infighting—
sometimes lasting over weeks or months—that undermines coalition formation in some 
parliamentary systems.  While institutional reforms of this kind are not unknown (Brams, 
2008), it would be wise to precede the adoption of FB with empirical studies that help to 
gauge its probable effects. 
                                                 
12 For some countries, there are quantitative data on the positions of political parties on a left-right scale, 
and likewise for the US Supreme Court.  Implicitly, these data presume that the preferences of the parties 
and justices are cardinally single-peaked, precluding the formation of disconnected coalitions using the FB 
model (but not of multiple FB coalitions).  We know of no data in which players have the same left-right 
ordering of each other but have different perceptions of distance, as we illustrated  in section 2 for the 
ordinally single-peaked preferences of players 3 and 4 in Example A.        33
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Table 1.  FB Coalitions with Players A (Weight 2) and a, b, c (Weight 1 Each) 
 
A a b c 
a’s Ranking  b’s Ranking  FB Coalition  Level  Leader(s) 
A b c  c a A  Aa  2  A, a 
A b c  a c A  Aa  2  A, a 
A b c  a A c  Aa  2  A, a 
b A c  c a A  Aa  3  a 
b A c  a c A  Aa  3  a 
b A c  a A c  Aab# 3 a 
b c A  c a A  abc  3  b 
b c A  a c A  abc  3  b 
b c A  a A c  Ab*  3  A, b 
 
 
a A b c 
A’s Ranking  b’s Ranking  FB Coalition  Level  Leader(s) 
a b c  c A a  aA  2  a, A 
a b c  A c a  aA   2  a, A 
a b c  A a c  aA  2  a, A 
b a c  c A a  Ab  3  b 
b a c  A c a  Ab  2  A, b 
b a c  A a c  Ab  2  A, b 
b c a  c A a  Ab  3  b 
b c a  A c a  Ab  2  A, b 
b c a  A a c  Ab  2  A, b 
 
 
* = disconnected coalition   35
Table 2.  FB Coalitions with Players A, B (Weight 2 Each) and a, b (Weight 1 Each) 
 
A B a b 
B’s Ranking  a’s Ranking  FB Coalition  Level  Leader(s) 
A a b  b B a  AB  2  A, B 
A a b  B b A  AB  2  A, B 
A a b  B A b  AB  2  A, B 
a A b  b B A  AB  3  B 
a A b  B b A  AB  3  B 
a A b  B A b  ABa# 3 B 
a b A  b B A  Bab  3  a 
a b A  B b A  Bab  3  a 
a b A  B A b  ABab#  4  B, a 
 
 
A a B b 
a’s Ranking  B’s Ranking  FB Coalition  Level  Leader(s) 
A B b  b a A  AaBb#  4  a, B 
A B b  a b A  AaBb#  4  a, B 
A B b  a A b  AaB#  3  a 
B A b  b a A  AaBb#  4  a, B 
B A b  a b A  AaBb#  4  a, B 
B A b  a A b  AaB#  3  a 
B b A  b a A  aBb  3  B 
B b A  a b A  aBb  3  B 
B b A  a A b  AB*  3  B 
 
 
* = disconnected coalition 
 
# = contains superfluous member(s)   36
Table 2 (cont.).  FB Coalitions with Players A, B (Weight 2 Each) and a, b (Weight 1 
Each) 
 
A a b B 
a’s Ranking  b’s Ranking  FB Coalition  Level  Leader(s) 
A b B  B a A  AabB#  4  a, b 
A b B  a B A  AabB#  4  a, b 
A b B  a A B  Aab  3  a 
b A B  B a A  AabB#  4  a, b 
b A B  a B A  AabB#  4  a, b 
b A B  a A B  Aab  3  a 
b B A  B a A  abB  3  b 
b B A  a B A  abB  3  b 
b B A  a A B  AabB#  4  a, b 
 
 
a A B b 
A’s Ranking  B’s Ranking  FB Coalition  Level  Leader(s) 
a B b  b A a  AB  3  A, B 
a B b  A b a  AB  3  B 
a B b  A a b  aAB#  3  A 
B a b  b A a  AB  3  B 
B a b  A b a  AB  2  A, B 
B a b  A a b  AB  2  A, B 
B b a  b A a  ABb#  3  B 
B b A  A b a  AB  2  A, B 
B b A  A a b  AB  2  A, B 
 
 
# = contains superfluous member(s)   37
Table 3.  FB Coalitions with Players A, B, C (Weight 2 Each) and a (Weight 1) 
 
a A B C 
A’s Ranking  B’s Ranking  FB Coalition  Level  Leader(s) 
a B C  C A a  BC  2  B, C 
a B C  A C a  AB  3  A 
a B C  A a C  AB  3  A 
B a C  C A a  BC  2  B, C 
B a C  A C a  AB  2  A, B 
B a C  A a C  AB  2  A, B 
B C a  C A a  BC  2  B, C 
B C a  A C a  AB  2  A, B 
B C a  A a C  AB  2  A, B 
 
 
A a B C 
a’s Ranking  B’s Ranking  FB Coalition  Level  Leader(s) 
A B C  C a A  BC  2  B, C 
A B C  a C A  AaBC# 4 a, B 
A B C  a A C  AaB  3  a 
B A C  C a A  BC  2  B, C 
B A C  a C A  BC  3  B 
B A C  a A C  AaB# 3 a 
B C A  C a A  BC  2  B, C 
B C A  a C A  aBC# 3 B 
B C A  a A C  AaBC# 4 a, B 
 
 
# = contains superfluous member(s) 
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